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I. INTRODUCTION 
With an increase in social entrepreneurship taking place over the 
past decade, state legislatures have felt a growing demand to adopt new 
corporate governance structures that align with the various objectives of 
U.S. companies. Social entrepreneurship, or social enterprise, has be-
come the popular term used to describe business forms that aim to pro-
duce profits while also seeking to significantly advance one or more so-
cial or environmental goals.1 Today, “[t]he idea of using business to cre-
ate social and environmental value alongside profits has reached nearly 
every sector of the economy . . . .”2 Social entrepreneurs can be found 
not only in progressive industries like organic farming and renewable 
energy, but also in more conservative industries such as insurance and 
banking.3 Leading proponents of this new business form have successful-
ly lobbied state legislatures across the country to recognize the entrepre-
neurs’ desire for new corporate governance structures.4 Ben & Jerry’s, 
Patagonia, and Seventh Generation are just a few of the well-known 
companies that pushed their respective states to adopt what is being 
called “benefit corporation” legislation.5 Their efforts are particular ex-
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 1. See Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Is Social Enterprise the New Corporate Social Respon-
sibility?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1351, 1361–62 (2011). 
 2. John Tozzi, America’s Most Promising Social Entrepreneurs, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK 
(June 8, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/running_small_business/archives/2010/06/ 
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amples from a movement that has resulted in nineteen states adopting 
some form of “benefit corporation”6 governance status within existing 
corporate codes.7 
In the spring of 2010, Maryland and Vermont became the first 
states to enact benefit corporation legislation,8 with California, Hawaii, 
New Jersey, Virginia, and New York following suit in 2011.9  New legis-
lation has allowed incorporating businesses to choose an off-the-shelf 
formation type that better aligns with the ideals of its own goals and em-
beds a social mission into its legal structure. It has also provided a path 
for existing incorporated businesses to amend their corporate charters to 
become benefit corporations.10 
The bulk of the newly implemented statutory forms provide not on-
ly a new framework for social entrepreneurs to work within, but also an 
indication to socially conscious investors, consumers, and business part-
ners that these businesses are obligated and dedicated to operating in a 
responsible and sustainable manner—in addition to their duty to generate 
shareholder profits. Public Benefit Corporations (PBCs) are generally 
formed in the same manner as traditional for-profit companies;11 howev-
er, a PBC entity is usually required to identify in its certificate of incor-
poration a statement of purpose identifying one or more specific public 
benefits to be promoted by the corporation, and the entity must have a 
name that clearly identifies its status as a PBC.12 
The compulsory notice requirement in a company’s certificate of 
incorporation announces to the world, and particularly to interested in-
vestors, that the PBC’s purpose may not align with the profit-driven 
business form shareholders have come to expect.13 As the number of 
                                                     
 6. “Benefit corporation status represents a new legal structure whereby participating firms are 
legally obliged to consider social and environmental concerns on an equal footing to financial 
gains.” Beyond Corporate Profits and Towards New Model Capitalism, WORLD FIN. (Apr. 11, 
2014), http://www.worldfinance.com/strategy/beyond-corporate-profits-and-towards-new-model-
capitalism [hereinafter Beyond Corporate Profits]. 
 7. B LAB, supra note 4. 
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5–6C–01 to –07); Act of May 19, 2010, 2010 Vt. Acts & Resolves 228 (codified at VT. STAT. ANN. 
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 10. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 363(a) (2013). In Delaware, an existing corporation that is not 
a public benefit corporation may—with approval of 90% of the outstanding shares of each class of 
the corporation’s stock—amend its certificate of incorporation to include a provision identifying 
within its statement of business or purpose one or more specific public benefits to be promoted by 
the corporation. Id. 
 11. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 361 (2013). 
 12. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362 (2013). 
 13. D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 277–78 (1998). 
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PBCs continues to increase across the country14—indicating that this 
form is gaining traction and becoming somewhat popular among new 
business founders and even consumers—many unknowns exist regarding 
how individual and institutional investors will respond.15 In traditional 
for-profit corporate governance structures, directors arguably have a 
general duty to maximize shareholder value, and, at a minimum, have a 
duty to advance the long-term interest of stockholders.16 In drafting PBC 
statutes, advocates of social enterprise and supportive legislators intend-
ed to avoid the presupposed mandate for corporations to solely maximize 
shareholder wealth as a matter of corporate purpose.17 PBCs are sup-
posed to operate not just for the benefit of the shareholders, but directors 
of these entities must aim to make decisions that are in the best interest 
of society as a whole, as well as the bottom line.18 
Currently, hundreds of private companies throughout the United 
States have formed or converted into PBCs, but no publicly traded com-
pany has embraced the PBC form.19 With Delaware enacting new legisla-
tion enabling the formation of PBCs in August 2013,20 Campbell Soup 
Company (Campbell) became the only publicly traded corporation in the 
United States with a wholly owned subsidiary that is a PBC.21 Plum Or-
ganics, PBC (Plum Organics) was acquired by Campbell in May 2013, 
and while Campbell has stated that it embraces Plum Organics’ mission 
and efforts under the PBC form, questions remain about how Campbell 
                                                     
 14. In 2008, there were 125 Certified B Corporations; as of today, there are over 950. Beyond 
Corporate Profits, supra note 6. “Certified B Corporation is a certification conferred by the nonprof-
it B Lab. . . . Benefit corporations do NOT need to be certified.” B LAB, supra note 4. 
 15. It is generally unknown how PBCs will attract investors and whether any will ever “go 
public” and attract individual and institutional investors. See Alicia Plerhoples, Delaware Public 
Benefit Corporations 90 Days Out: Who’s Opting In?, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 247 (2014). 
 16. Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 2010). “As it has long done, Dela-
ware law still requires directors to put shareholder interests ahead of those of nonshareholders. At 
least in Delaware, the shareholder wealth maximization norm thus remains a more accurate descrip-
tion of the state of the law than any of its competitors.” Alicia E. Plerhoples, Can an Old Dog Learn 
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the Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 817, 825 (2012). 
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Company, CO.EXIST (Jan. 22, 2014, 8:08 AM), http://www.fastcoexist.com/3024991/world-
changing-ideas/inside-plum-organics-the-first-benefit-corporation-owned-by-a-public-co. 
 20. Delaware Unveils Public Benefit Corporation Legislation, DELAWARE.GOV (Apr. 18, 
2013), http://news.delaware.gov/2013/04/18/delaware-unveils-public-benefit-corporation-legislation. 
 21. Aman Singh, Campbell Becomes America’s First Public Company to Acquire a Public 
Benefit Corporation: In Conversation with Plum Organics’ Cofounder, CSRWIRE (Sept. 17, 2013, 
8:41 AM), http://www.csrwire.com/blog/posts/1005-campbell-becomes-america-s-first-public-
company-to-acquire-a-public-benefit-corporation-in-conversation-with-plum-organics-cofounder. 
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will be able to align the PBC principles of the subsidiary while  respond-
ing to its own shareholders’ concerns regarding the pressures of quarterly 
and annual balance sheets.22 
This Note addresses the prospective risk that traditional shareholder 
expectations could dissuade directors of publicly traded for-profit com-
panies from investing in and acquiring PBCs as wholly owned subsidiar-
ies; specifically, because inconsistent corporate purposes between a par-
ent company and its subsidiary could result in an unprecedented new 
type of director liability. Part II of this Note begins by presenting back-
ground information on the Delaware PBC statute. It also provides a brief 
overview of the differing duties between directors of traditional for-profit 
corporations and those of PBCs in fulfilling corporate purposes. Part III 
analyzes the potential for shareholders of a parent company to enjoin 
directors from investing in or acquiring a PBC as a wholly owned subsid-
iary. Part IV explores the ability of shareholders to select investments in 
a publicly traded parent company for the sole purpose of bringing a dou-
ble derivative lawsuit on behalf of the parent company to enforce certain 
social expectations on behalf of a PBC subsidiary. Part V acknowledges 
several steps that directors of publicly traded companies should consider 
before approving plans to embrace a PBC entity within its web of subsid-
iary businesses. Finally, Part VI provides a brief conclusion. 
II. DELAWARE AND ITS PBC LAW 
Part II discusses how Delaware introduced and adopted PBC legis-
lation, and notes the impact that Delaware’s leadership in corporate law 
may have on future issues related to PBCs. Additionally, it discusses fa-
cial differences in Delaware’s new PBC law that are of importance when 
discussing corporate purpose and the governing duties of directors. 
A. Delaware’s Adoption of PBC Law 
PBC legislation was introduced under Senate Bill 47 on April 18, 
2013, in the 147th Delaware General Assembly.23 Senate Bill 47, entitled 
An Act to Amend Title 8 of the Delaware Code Relating to the General 
Corporation Law, would enable the formation of PBCs in Delaware.24 
The Bill was lauded by Senator David Sokola, who stated that he was 
proud to sponsor legislation that gave “corporations a way to rebuild 
public trust in business by ensuring that the benefits of their work ex-
                                                     
 22. Id. 
 23. S.B. 47, 147th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2013), available at http://www.legis. 
delaware.gov/LIS/LIS147.NSF/vwLegislation/SB+47?Opendocument. 
 24. Id. 
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tend[ed] beyond their stockholders and managers.”25 The bill received 
bipartisan support upon its introduction, and unanimous approval in both 
the State House and Senate followed.26 Upon signing the bill, Delaware’s 
Governor also issued the following statement of support: “With the addi-
tion of Public Benefit Corporations, Delaware will continue to be a lead-
er and support a new movement of social entrepreneurs and investors 
who are stepping forward to meet high standards of corporate purpose, 
accountability and transparency.”27 
On August 1, 2013, Delaware’s PBC legislation went into effect, 
and businesses began to file the necessary paperwork to form PBCs in 
accordance with the new law.28 In total, seventeen businesses filed to 
incorporate as PBCs on the first day of enactment.29 More than 110 busi-
nesses incorporated as PBCs in the State of Delaware between August 1, 
2013 and December 31, 2013.30 
B. Delaware’s Leadership in Corporate Law 
Delaware is the home of more than one million legal entities and 
many of the nation’s largest businesses.31 And because Delaware is also 
home “to most venture-backed businesses, 50% of all publicly-traded 
companies, and 64% of the Fortune 500, it is the most important state for 
businesses that seek access to venture capital, private equity, and public 
capital markets.”32 
But beyond the numbers, Delaware’s leadership in corporate law 
derives from its “well-established body of precedent, its highly regarded 
judiciary, . . . its supposed tilt (or lack thereof, depending on one’s view-
point) toward management or investors. Delaware’s bench also has the 
advantage of having so many opportunities to address critical corporate 
law issues.”33 Accordingly, Delaware has arguably the most developed 
body of corporate common law jurisprudence dictating the appropriate 
                                                     
 25. Delaware Unveils Public Benefit Corporation Legislation, supra note 20. 
 26. See S.B. 47, 147th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2013), available at http://www.legis. 
delaware.gov/LIS/LIS147.NSF/vwLegislation/SB+47?Opendocument. 
 27. Delaware Unveils Public Benefit Corporation Legislation, supra note 20. 
 28. Governor Markell Registers Delaware’s First Public Benefit Corporations, 
DELAWARE.GOV (Aug. 1, 2013), http://news.delaware.gov/2013/08/01/governor-markell-registers-
delawares-first-public-benefit-corporations/. 
 29. Id. 
 30. JEFFERY W. BULLOCK, DELAWARE DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 1 
(2014), available at http://corp.delaware.gov/Corporations_2013%20Annual%20Report.pdf. 
 31. Delaware Unveils Public Benefit Corporation Legislation, supra note 20. 
 32. B LAB, supra note 4. 
 33. Lyman Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: Business Judgment Rule, 
Corporate Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, 408 (2013). 
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application of fiduciary principles.34 Furthermore, recent rulings from 
Delaware’s Court of Chancery regarding the matter of corporate purpose 
will likely influence how shareholders today view their position within 
the concept of the firm.35 
As a result of Delaware’s dominance over these matters, it is natu-
ral for business lawyers, scholars, and the rest of the country to look to 
its courts for guidance in the application of new benefit corporation laws 
when novel and unusual conflicts and questions arise regarding the man-
agement and operation of PBCs. 
C. Changes in the New Law 
Delaware’s new PBC law departs from the general corporate code 
controlling for-profit companies in two principal ways: it transforms both 
the standard corporate purpose and the duties of corporate directors. 36 
1. Corporate Purpose 
Under Delaware’s general corporation law, the statute governing 
corporate purpose broadly states that a corporation may be incorporated 
or organized “to conduct or promote any lawful business or purposes.”37 
However, Delaware’s new PBC statute requires that electing corpora-
tions, in pursuing any lawful business, trade, or activity, promote a spe-
cific public benefit or public benefits and operate in a responsible and 
sustainable manner.38 “Public benefits for which corporations may be 
formed include, but are not limited to, those of an artistic, charitable, cul-
tural, economic, educational, environmental, literary, medical, religious, 
scientific or technical nature.”39 
2. Director’s Duties 
Delaware’s general corporation law imposes two basic fiduciary 
duties on directors, that of loyalty and that of care.40 Corporate directors 
owe these duties both to the corporation itself and to its shareholders.41 
                                                     
 34. See David B. Feirstein, Note, Parents and Subsidiaries in Delaware: A Dysfunctional 
Standard, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 479 (2006). 
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 36. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a) (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365 (2013). 
 37. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (2011). 
 38. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a) (2013). 
 39. Governor Markell Registers Delaware’s First Public Benefit Corporations, supra note 28. 
 40. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. Ch. 1939). 
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One of the most significant developments that emerged from the 
implementation of Delaware’s new PBC law is the statutory duty PBC 
directors owe to additional stakeholders.42 Delaware’s PBC law outlines 
three primary duties that directors of a PBC are expected to balance in 
their managerial and administrative roles: 
The board of directors shall manage or direct the business and af-
fairs of the public benefit corporation in a manner that balances the 
pecuniary interests of the stockholders, the best interests of those 
materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the specific 
public benefit or public benefits identified in its certificate of incor-
poration.43 
For companies electing to become PBCs, the recent developments 
in Delaware’s corporate code dramatically alter how fiduciary principles 
will be applied to those directors attempting to satisfy a PBC’s corporate 
purpose. In light of the changes stemming from Delaware’s new PBC 
law, the next two Parts focus specifically on the new paradigm of public-
ly traded corporations acquiring or forming wholly owned PBC subsidi-
aries. 
III. INVESTING IN OR ACQUIRING A PBC AND THE POTENTIAL FOR 
DIRECTOR LIABILITY 
The history of corporate law, while not completely clear-cut, has 
generally reiterated that directors, in fulfilling their corporate duties, “are 
to maximize shareholders profits, ‘subject to the constraint that the cor-
poration must meet all its legal obligations to others.’”44 This traditional 
position is most notably emphasized in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., where 
the court stated: 
[A] business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for 
the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be 
employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised 
in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a 
change in the end itself . . . .45 
                                                                                                                       
honest belief that their actions are in the best interest of the company.” Johnson, supra note 33, at 
411 (citing Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812); see also Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 
360–61 (Del. 1994). 
 42. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365 (2013) (amended 2014). 
 43. Id. § 365(a). 
 44. Mark E. Van Der Weide, Against Fiduciary Duties to Corporate Stakeholders, 21 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 27, 29 (1996); accord Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
 45. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684. 
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Although this traditional viewpoint46 often appears from business con-
vention to be the only acceptable corporate purpose of, and the ultimate 
constraint on, director decisionmaking, the Delaware Supreme Court has 
mandated little, if any, action forcing corporate directors to maximize 
profits or shareholder wealth.47 Delaware courts have noted that corpora-
tions should advance the long-term interests of stockholders, and a direc-
tor’s duty to maximize share prices in the short term arises only in one 
narrow setting: “a corporation’s ‘end-stage,’ i.e., in a corporate break-up, 
when they initiate an active bidding process, or when they enter into a 
transaction that shifts a dispersed shareholding base into a controller’s 
hands, essentially a privatization.”48 
Delaware courts use the business judgment rule to protect director 
decisionmaking, so long as decisions made remain aligned with Dela-
ware’s traditional law for corporate purpose—“to conduct or promote 
any lawful business or purposes.”49 The business judgment rule estab-
lishes the presumption “that in making a business decision the directors 
of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the hon-
est belief that the action taken was in the best interest of the company.”50 
The Delaware courts are not in the practice of second-guessing business 
decisions made by corporate directors;51 the Delaware courts recognize 
that directors, not judges, are the ones elected by a corporation’s stock-
holders to run and manage the affairs of each unique company.52  Thus, 
absent a showing that corporate directors (1) failed to “use that amount 
of care which ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in a similar 
circumstances”53—breaching the duty of care—or (2) wrongly engaged 
in self-dealing or appropriating corporate opportunities—breaching the 
duty of loyalty54—Delaware courts will not regulate or control directors’ 
decisionmaking processes. 
                                                     
 46. Also referred to as the “shareholder primacy model.” Johnson, supra note 33, at 435. 
 47. See id. at 446–47. 
 48. Johnson, supra note 33, at 433; accord Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 
637 A.2d 34, 48–49 (Del. 1994); see also Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 
A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986). 
 49. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (2011). 
 50. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) (citing Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 
A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971)). 
 51. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1994). 
 52. See Lyman Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. L. 439, 
456–57 (2005). 
 53. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 749 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
 54. See, e.g., Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257, 263 (Del. 2002) (example of directors 
usurping a corporate opportunity); Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. Ch. 1939) (example of self-
dealing by corporate directors). 
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If the presumption remains under the business judgment rule that 
directors are behaving carefully and loyally in discharging their duties, 
and traditional for-profit corporations do not require the advancement of 
a particular corporate purpose, is a multistakeholder statute like the one 
allowing for the formation of PBCs necessary? And does it now change 
shareholder expectations of those investing in traditional for-profit cor-
porations? On the surface, the need for a PBC form may seem unneces-
sary or superfluous with so many director decisionmaking protections 
already in place. Yet, Delaware legislators felt that the adoption of this 
new business form necessitated missions and goals that went “beyond the 
historical board–stockholder relationship,”55 ensuring further protection 
for businesses and their management. 
Now that the PBC form exists under Delaware law, a strong argu-
ment could be made for the shareholder primacy model to become an 
increasingly standardized expectation of investors in traditional for-profit 
companies. These shareholders may come to believe that businesses that 
choose to divert from the norm of shareholder wealth-maximization will 
and should simply incorporate as, or convert to, a PBC instead of trying 
to operate under the same traditional governance structure. This perspec-
tive could grow and emerge over time as PBCs become increasingly 
more common or popular and investors become more educated about the 
differences between the two business types. The often shifting expecta-
tions and debates about the proper goals of corporate activity may finally 
come to rest; two different models provide for a separation between cor-
porations solely driven by profits and those taking a more holistic and 
social approach to business.56 
Because shareholder interests and expectations should have an im-
pact on the operation of today’s modern corporations, an attempt to un-
derstand the differences between the purpose of traditional for-profit 
corporations and PBCs must be considered carefully by directors and 
managers who plan to dip into both pots. Shareholder interests are not 
homogenous in today’s informed investing world. Shareholder interests 
“diverge in several ways[:] . . . . long-term versus short-term; diversified 
versus non-diversified; individual versus institutional; common versus 
preferred; stripped versus unstripped; dividend-income preferring versus 
capital-appreciation preferring.”57 In response to these realities, directors 
of for-profit companies ought to be prepared to adhere strictly to a tradi-
                                                     
 55. Delaware Unveils Public Benefit Corporation Legislation, supra note 20 (quoting Del. 
Rep. Bryon Short). 
 56. See Johnson, supra note 33, at 435. 
 57. Van Der Weide, supra note 44, at 37. 
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tional shareholder primacy model or consider actively lobbying majority 
shareholders to vote and approve an amendment to the corporation’s 
charter to become a PBC. 
As outlined above, the purpose-splitting under the new law pro-
vides entrepreneurs and company founders, for the first time, with an 
alternative to solely profit-seeking ventures.58 The PBC form allows di-
rectors the freedom to make decisions in light of established social mis-
sions and not just out of a strict allegiance to the company’s sharehold-
ers.59 A dichotomy between the levels of director duties arises, however, 
when a for-profit company, like Campbell, acquires a PBC, like Plum 
Organics, as a wholly owned subsidiary. As a long-standing and conven-
tionally formed for-profit corporation, Campbell remains restricted by 
the traditional corporate purpose principles outlined under Delaware 
General Corporation Law section 101, and as such, its directors should 
endeavor to operate primarily for the long-term benefit of its sharehold-
ers.60 However, in acquiring Plum Organics, Campbell has actively cho-
sen to invest in a social enterprise that may yield lower returns and divi-
dends for the company, which ultimately impacts the bottom line and 
affects earnings all the way up the food chain to its own shareholders. 
The potentially adverse financial impact on Campbell’s sharehold-
ers could theoretically result in a class action or derivative suit challeng-
ing the acquisition of Plum Organics simply because it is a PBC. While a 
resulting class action or derivative suit against the company seems re-
mote and unlikely, recent decisions issued by the Delaware courts should 
at least be considered before large for-profit companies follow in Camp-
bell’s footsteps and begin on a social enterprise investing spree.61 In 
2010, the Delaware Court of Chancery, outside the so-called Revlon-land 
setting,62 articulated the eBay opinion, stating that a for-profit corpora-
                                                     
 58. See Governor Markell Registers Delaware’s First Public Benefit Corporations, supra note 
28. 
 59. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365 (2014). 
 60. See eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.2d 1, 33 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 61. See, e.g., id. 
 62. The term Revlon-land refers to the point at which the Revlon doctrine applies: 
Under current Delaware law, if a business combination is deemed to constitute a “sale of 
the company” or a “sale of control” it is governed by the Revlon doctrine. That doctrine 
makes two important changes. First, the board’s fiduciary duties are no longer focused on 
the long-term well-being of the corporation . . . [but on the] interests of the stockholders 
in achieving a transaction that will maximize the immediate value of their 
shares. . . . Second, if the board’s performance of these “Revlon duties” is challenged, the 
court will not defer to the board’s business judgment even, though the board’s independ-
ence, disinterestedness, and diligence would have earned such deference under the busi-
ness judgment rule. 
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tion could not advance any corporate purpose it wished and that a corpo-
rate policy is improper if it does not seek to maximize economic value 
for stockholders.63 The facts of the case involved an investment in 
Craigslist, whose corporate sales policy and strategy was to operate as a 
community service, refusing to sell advertising space on its website.64 
Craigslist’s business model was deemed to be at odds with the rights and 
priorities of its shareholders, particularly minority shareholder eBay.65 
Chancellor Chandler noted that it was not for Craigslist’s directors to 
decide what purpose a corporation they founded and controlled should 
advance.66 He further stated that directors could not simply choose to 
reject or ignore their statutory obligations and that the “Inc.” at the end of 
a Delaware corporation’s name means the corporation’s board is pre-
cluded from advancing policies that “admittedly seek[] not to maximize 
the economic value of a for-profit Delaware corporation . . . .”67 This 
reaffirmation of the shareholder primacy model raises concerns for cor-
porate boards that wish to donate to charitable causes68 and invest in so-
cial enterprise as part of broad operational policies. 
While the shareholder primacy model’s dominance may concern 
companies seeking to expand the scope of their investments, sharehold-
ers may have little reason to worry when considering the long-term value 
of such investments. For example, when Campbell acquired Plum Organ-
ics in 2013, it paid a purchase price of $249 million.69 For a growing 
global food company like Campbell with annual sales of more than $8 
billion,70 this drop in the bucket likely went unnoticed by most of Camp-
bell’s shareholders. Plum Organics, even as a PBC, is also a great mar-
keting investment for Campbell with its booming growth—135% from 
2012 to 2013.71 Further, because Plum Organics’ socially-conscious pur-
pose may draw in new customers to the family of Campbell-brand prod-
                                                                                                                       
Clark W. Furlow, Reflections on the Revlon Doctrine, 11 U. PA. J.  BUS. L. 519, 520–521 (2009) 
(citing Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 36 (Del. 1994); Revlon, Inc. 
v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986)). 
 63. eBay, 16 A.2d at 34. 
 64. Id. at 33. 
 65. Id. at 34. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. (emphasis in original). “At the theory level, the opinion strongly manifests Berle’s 
‘trust’ conception of the director–stockholder relationship . . . .” Johnson, supra note 33, at 444. 
 68. “The test of whether a corporation may make a charitable gift is its reasonableness.” Sulli-
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ucts, the acquisition is arguably a low-risk transaction for Campbell. 
Overall, the acquisition of Plum Organics aligned with Campbell’s busi-
ness philosophies without much voiced concern from either company; 
both parties seem content, and disgruntled shareholders have not publicly 
admonished Campbell for its decision.72 Even the cofounder and presi-
dent of Plum Organics, Neil Grimmer, seemed unconcerned about any 
potential conflicts arising out of the transaction: “We have a mission cen-
tric core: nutrition and solving hunger with our benefit corporation sta-
tus[,] our secret sauce[,] and innovation driving the entire process. 
Campbell has a dual mandate: strengthen the core Campbell business 
while driving new consumers and innovation. It’s a perfect marriage.”73 
Although Campbell and Plum Organics’ utopian outcome seeming-
ly diminishes the appearance of any risk for directors investing in social 
enterprises, when diverging interests strike at the bottom line of a parent 
corporation’s share value, stockholders are sure to notice and take action. 
The point at which shareholders will have a valid claim against directors 
who actively divert funds to PBC subsidiaries as investments, while ex-
pecting little to no return for the parent company, is unknown. 
The bold moves that Campbell has taken in its social aspirations 
provide an exemplary model of goodwill; in 2013, Campbell reported 
charitable giving at $52.6 million—$44 million of which was food or in-
kind donations.74 Campbell chose, in part, to acquire Plum Organics be-
cause of Plum Organics’ social mission to help eradicate childhood hun-
ger, which aligned with Campbell’s own Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) program.75 Campbell’s vice-president, Dave Stangis, even stated 
that the two corporate teams “are connecting on joint priorities” to build 
on a “collective impact.”76 All of these decisions and steps are com-
mendable from a social mission perspective, but will profit-driven share-
holders see this conduct in the same light and from the same viewpoint 
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as the decisionmaking directors? They may not—and they may even be 
hostile to the idea—if from the outset the shareholders’ singular goal was 
to invest in a profit-driven company. A later realization that a sharehold-
er’s investment in a publicly traded, for-profit company includes ties to a 
PBC subsidiary could result in shareholders seeking retributive action. 
With a publicly traded company like Campbell, the liquidity of the 
market allows shareholders to speak with their pocketbooks and subse-
quently sell their shares in response to such an acquisition.77 But in the 
future, shareholders could potentially take a step further and act as they 
did in eBay and attempt to get the courts to enjoin the directors from 
even approving such an acquisition from the beginning. 
This potential issue is rather unsettling for Campbell and any parent 
company looking to invest in or acquire a PBC. The precise reach of the 
shareholder primacy model, in relation to the presumed business judg-
ment protection for directors, is untested in this particular circumstance. 
Whether strict corporate purposes should be mandated in order to clearly 
separate the convergence of these two entity models is a matter that only 
the Delaware courts will be able to answer. 
IV. POTENTIAL FOR DOUBLE DERIVATIVE SUITS 
“[I]n a parent and wholly-owned subsidiary context, the directors of 
the subsidiary are obligated only to manage the affairs of the subsidiary 
in the best interest of the parent and its shareholders.”78 This outlined 
expectation from a Delaware Supreme Court opinion seems to indicate a 
fairly clear guideline for directors of wholly owned subsidiaries: act in 
the best interest of the parent.79 But a traditional, single-purpose path 
cannot reasonably be undertaken by directors of a PBC subsidiary who 
are obligated by law to consider various stakeholders, not just one.80 In 
the decisionmaking process, these directors must balance their duties 
carefully, while also being cognizably aware of any potential for a dou-
ble derivative suit. 
A double derivative suit is an action brought by the shareholder, or 
shareholders, of the parent corporation to redress a wrong at the subsidi-
ary level and enforce a cause of action belonging to the wholly owned 
subsidiary.81 Shareholders of a parent company possess the unique stand-
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ing to bring double derivative suits on behalf of a company’s wholly 
owned subsidiary.82 Typically, only the parent corporation, acting through 
its board of directors, is empowered to enforce these claims, but in particu-
lar cases,83 shareholders of the parent may possess such a right.84 Funda-
mentally, this power means that the shareholders of a traditional for-
profit company could maintain an action on behalf of a wholly owned 
PBC subsidiary where all other factors necessary to maintain a conven-
tional derivative suit are present. 
Under Delaware’s PBC law, “Stockholders of a public benefit cor-
poration . . . may maintain a derivative lawsuit to enforce the require-
ments set forth” for directors.85 Specifically, the law states: 
The board of directors shall manage or direct the business and af-
fairs of the public benefit corporation in a manner that balances the 
pecuniary interests of the stockholders, the best interests of those 
materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the specific 
public benefit or public benefits identified in its certificate of incor-
poration.86 
Where the directors of a parent company could validly bring a derivative 
lawsuit against the directors of a wholly owned PBC subsidiary for fail-
ing to properly balance the three duties required by the PBC statute, the 
law also arguably creates a right for shareholders of the parent company 
to bring the same lawsuit when and if the parent company directors fail 
to do so.87 
The magnitude of this latent outcome can be realized under two 
specific situations: (1) where the PBC subsidiary fails to provide for its 
specified social purpose and is instead kicking all or most of its profit up 
to the parent company; or the inverse, (2) where the PBC subsidiary, in 
prioritizing its social mission, fails to yield any real profit to the invest-
ing parent company. Both of these outcomes would result in severe fi-
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nancial imbalances unlikely to go ignored by a parent company’s stock-
holders. 
While the first outcome may appear ideal to an investor trying to 
make a quick buck, socially conscious investors may begin to seek out 
publicly traded  companies with wholly owned PBC subsidiaries as a 
means to indirectly invest in PBCs prior to the establishment of a public-
ly traded PBC. These individuals may become activist investors that de-
mand and pressure the directors of the parent company to reject certain 
policies or guidelines as a means to hold the PBC subsidiary accountable 
to its stated public benefit. 
In contrast, in the latter situation, a money-hungry investor may 
make an opposing argument: the PBC subsidiary, in redirecting profit to 
its stated public benefit, is neglecting to return an adequate dividend to 
the parent company, thus diminishing overall returns to all stockholders 
at the top of the food chain. While both situations demonstrate extreme 
depictions on either side of the spectrum, these circumstances could 
come to fruition in some form.88 An ensuing double derivative suit would 
be the expected proceeding to effectuate a forcible change at the subsidi-
ary level by stockholders of the parent company.89  
V. BEST PRACTICES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Uncharted and untested territory in corporate law can be an un-
pleasant reality for any business, especially when a company’s board of 
directors tries to make strategic business decisions in light of new and 
developing law. Looking ahead, directors and executives should be able 
to continue under the presumption of the business judgment rule when 
making investment decisions they believe add shareholder value while 
also contributing to a social good. Part V is meant to offer best practice 
recommendations for a traditional for-profit company considering mak-
ing a social enterprise investment and possibly acquiring a PBC as a sub-
sidiary. Suggestions are made in an attempt to help maximize the effec-
tiveness of these investments while minimizing potentially opportunistic 
or wasteful behavior—or the appearance of opportunistic or wasteful 
behavior—by directors. 
A. Align Investment with Current Business Activities 
When viewing a corporation’s entire portfolio of businesses, sub-
sidiaries, and brands, the board of directors should ensure that all of its 
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decisions contribute to the financial growth of the company. As repeated-
ly shown,90 a for-profit company’s purpose is derived from the require-
ment that directors make decisions for the long-term benefit of the corpo-
ration’s stockholders. Therefore, in order to fulfill this requirement when 
investing in PBCs, directors of for-profit companies should carefully 
consider how to align these investments with current business activities. 
Campbell is an important first example for businesses to follow. As 
a large conglomerate, Campbell looked at what areas of the grocery food 
market were growing; it targeted baby food—specifically, organic baby 
food—and acquired a business that would expose its already established 
brand to a multitude of new consumers.91 Campbell’s acquisition of Plum 
Organics was anything but random or hasty; it was deliberate and well 
planned.92 Additionally, Campbell has maintained Plum Organics as a 
standalone business,93 furthering plans for the businesses to synergize 
only some of their distinct operational and sustainability resources where 
it would better improve the profitability of both companies.94 This exam-
ple of cooperation between Campbell and Plum Organics presents a 
compelling justification for stockholders, who have likely studied this 
strategic acquisition when they consider whether they want to remain 
invested in Campbell or cash out and sell their shares. 
Following Campbell’s example, company directors must assure 
their stockholders that the acquisition of a particular PBC is not simply a 
marketing ploy or a nonstrategic philanthropic decision, but that real re-
turns from the acquisition will manifest for the parent company and the 
stockholders as a whole. Most importantly, a board should only approve 
an acquisition of a PBC subsidiary when it truly believes that there will 
be significant benefits gained as a result of the deal, and that those bene-
fits will be consistent with the business strategy that the directors have 
undertaken and presented to their stockholders. 
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B. Align Investment with Current Corporate Social Responsibility Plans 
Aligning the interests of potential investments with current business 
activities is a smart first step, but aligning an investment in a PBC with a 
company’s existing charitable goals may also help to mitigate potential 
liability risks. Many large businesses already have corporate social re-
sponsibility (CSR) platforms that donate millions of dollars to founda-
tions and charity groups every year.95 Many of these programs and initia-
tives are established to utilize a business’s unique resources and leverage 
its position to make a greater and higher-yielding impact for a social 
good.96 If companies investing in PBCs utilize an approach similar to 
that outlined in their CSR intitiatives, their efforts may not be viewed as 
disruptive or financially harmful. Aligning current social goals with a 
material investment is a strategic move that could appeal to current cus-
tomers and employees, eventually increasing the corporation’s market 
base and value. 
Utilizing a transparent approach that informs stockholders of the 
similarly aligned motives and goals between both the parent company 
and the PBC subsidiary will help reduce skepticism about the company’s 
motivation in acquiring a PBC and ensure that stockholders understand a 
board’s reasoning and purpose for making this particular business deci-
sion. 
When Campbell issued a press release regarding the acquisition of 
Plum Organics, it took these important steps to demonstrate and cele-
brate how the two companies shared aligned pursuits and similarities.97 
For Campbell, this included highlighting its past campaigns to help target 
and eradicate hunger and provide resources to New Jersey-based food 
programs and food banks.98 Campbell can easily argue that bringing in a 
PBC subsidiary like Plum Organics furthers its social mission, which is 
familiar and well-known to Campbell’s stockholders—it does not dis-
place current expectations. 
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C. Establish Standards of Independence for Directors 
When a corporation’s board is seeking to acquire a PBC as a wholly 
owned subsidiary, as with all acquisitions, it should ensure that its direc-
tors avoid self-dealing or lauding self-interested transactions. Delaware 
jurisprudence demands that “the best interests of the corporation and its 
stockholders take precedence over any personal interest or bias of a di-
rector that is not shared by stockholders.”99 A potential conflict arises 
most notably when a company proposes to acquire a subsidiary that is in 
some way affiliated with one of the company’s directors or officers.100 
Corporate directors should neither appear on both sides of a trans-
action nor expect to derive any personal financial benefit from a transac-
tion.101 Thus, it is prudent for directors to bear in mind that courts can and 
will set aside deals that do not follow a fair procedure or result in a fair 
value for stockholders.102 To avoid the appearance of a conflict of inter-
est, companies should adopt strict rules or standards103 that disqualify 
any director who may be an investor in, or play some instrumental role 
(i.e., officer or director) in, the potential target business from overseeing 
the acquisition process or voting on the proposed deal. Simply put, inter-
nal controls must prevent directors and executives from interfering with 
any aspect of an acquisition that is likely to yield personal benefit. 
D. Measure Financial Performance as a Resulting Benefit of the Social 
Contribution 
Similar to charitable contributions, if a company can demonstrate 
that its investment in a PBC increases shareholder value and social wel-
fare, it can decrease its risk of potential lawsuits and shareholder aban-
donment.104 To account for this, a parent company must establish per-
formance measurement systems that evaluate progress towards specific 
economic and social goals.105 
Some of the benefits that might manifest themselves as a result of a 
social enterprise acquisition may be intangible and long-term in nature, 
so it is crucial for the company to devise a method that can properly as-
sess returned value.106 As Matteo Tonello notes in an article on Corporate 
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Philanthropy, “Measuring social performance is challenging, but signifi-
cant progress has been made in developing tools that companies can use 
to estimate the societal impact of their . . . activities, [including] proce-
dures for estimating an overall social return on investment”107 Increased 
transparency and clear impact statements that demonstrate directors’ 
smart investing decisions and indicating a real return to stockholders are 
important to validate any social enterprise investment. As an ancillary 
benefit, “disclosure may strengthen the company’s reputation as a good 
citizen with its customers and with the communities in which it oper-
ates.”108 
E. Involve Institutional Investors 
As the number of institutional investors continues to increase,109 
their large share ownership is also being used to wield influence over 
managerial decisionmaking processes. Research indicates that institu-
tional investors already influence, and in some cases curtail, corporate 
philanthropic giving.110 Therefore, it would not be unprecedented to see 
institutional investors further impact the level and amount of social en-
terprise investing. For example, the influence of institutional investors 
could potentially lead to stricter monitoring of corporate activities as a 
whole, or perhaps indirectly influence how companies support or favor 
certain types of transactions involving social enterprises.111 Either way, 
directors should be prepared to welcome institutional investor input and, 
in the worst-case scenario, prepare to answer any criticism. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The new direction and addition of the PBC statute to Delaware’s 
corporate code provides a measure of stability and predictability for so-
cially motivated businesses. It is the type of forward-thinking, dynamic, 
and responsive law that businesses have come to expect from Delaware’s 
state legislature. Yet at the same time, it creates an untested and unpre-
dictable form, and as with any new law, there exists some level of unpre-
dictability with regard to its application. Uncertainty about what consti-
tutes the traditional corporate purpose following the eBay decision is fur-
ther complicated when attempting to predict investor responses to a tradi-
tional corporation acquiring a PBC as a wholly owned subsidiary. Direc-
tors of public companies face a growing number of challenges112 in car-
rying out their duties and managing new risks. But if the Campbell–Plum 
Organics illustration has revealed anything, it is that certain paramount 
steps113 can be implemented by directors of both the parent company and 
the target PBC subsidiary, which are within the business judgment of 
each board, that ensure shareholder trust remains intact and that both lev-
els of businesses continue to thrive without issue. 
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